Abstract. We present a formal executable speci cation of two crucial JavaCard platform components, namely the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) and the ByteCode Veri er (BCV). Moreover, we relate both components by giving a proof of correctness of the ByteCode Veri er. Both formalisations and proofs have been machined-checked using the proof assistant C o q .
Introduction

Background
JavaCard 26] is a popular programming language for multiple application smart cards. According to the JavaCard Forum 25], which i n volves key players in the eld of smart cards, including smart card manufacturers and banks, the JavaCard language has two important features that make it the ideal choice for smart cards:
JavaCard programs are written in a subset of Java, using the JavaCard APIs (Application Programming Interfaces). JavaCard developers can therefore bene t from the well-established Java t e c hnology the JavaCard security model enables multiple applications to coexist on the same card and communicate securely, and in principle, enables new applications to be loaded on the card after its issuance. Yet recent research h a s u n veiled several problems in the JavaCard security model, most notably with object sharing and the associated mechanism of shareable interfaces, see e.g. 20, 34] . This has emphasised the necessity to develop environments for verifying the security of the JavaCard platform and of JavaCard programs. Thus far JavaCard security (and also Java security) has been studied mainly at two levels: platform level: here the goal is to prove safety properties of the language, in particular type safety a n d properties related to memory management application level: here the goal is to prove that a speci c program obeys a given property, and in particular that it satis es a security policy, for example based on information ow. Over the last few years, both elds have been the subject of intensive investigations, see Subsection 6.1. Despite impressive progress, much w ork remains to be done. In particular, there is no complete formalisation of the JavaCard platform as yet nor widely used tools to verify applets' properties. Besides, we do not know of any e n vironment that supports veri cation both at platform and application levels.
Our work
The main contributions reported here are (1) a formal executable speci cation of two crucial JavaCard 2.1. platform components, namely the Java Card Virtual Machine JCVM and the ByteCode Veri er BCV (2) a m a c hine-checked proof of correctness of the ByteCode Veri er. Both formalisations and proofs have b e e n carried out in the proof assistant Coq 4] . The salient features of our formal speci cation are: executability. Our formal semantics (both of the virtual machine and of the veri er) may be executed on any J a vaCard program (given a Coq implementation of the native methods used by the program) and its behaviour can be checked against reference implementations, in this case Sun's implementation of the JavaCard Virtual Machine. We view executability as a crucial asset for reliability and, in our opinion, a formal operational semantics for a (realistic) programming language must be executable
JavaCard vs Java
JavaCard is an ideal language for formal veri cation, since it is a reasonably-sized language with industrial applications. As compared to Java, the JavaCard Virtual Machine (in its current version) lacks garbage collection, dynamic class loading and multi-threading. In contrast, the rewall mechanism is a complex feature that is proper to JavaCard.
Organisation of the paper
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we describe our formalisation of JavaCard programs (after linking). In Section 3, we describe a small-step operational semantics of the JavaCard Virtual Machine, where each instruction is modelled as a state transformer. In Section 4, we d e r i v e from the virtual machine an abstract virtual machine that operates on types (instead of values) and prove its correctness. In Section 5, we use the abstract virtual machine to build a ByteCode Veri er and prove it correct. In Section 6, we conclude with related and future work.
A primer on Coq
Coq 4] is a proof assistant based on the Calculus of Inductive Constructions. It combines a speci cation language (featuring inductive and record types) and a higher-order predicate logic (via the Curry-Howard isomorphism). All functions in Coq are required to be terminating. In order to enforce termination, recursive functions must be de ned by structural recursion. Besides, all functions are required to be total. To h a n d l e partial functions, we use the lift monad which i s i n troduced through the inductive t ype:
Inductive Exc A:Set] : Set := value : A->(Exc A) | error : (Exc A)
Our speci cations only make a limited use of dependent types a salient feature of Coq. This design choice was motivated by portability by not using dependent types in an essential way, our formalisations can be transposed easily to other proof assistants, including PVS and Isabelle.
We close this primer with some notation. We u s e * to denote cartesian product of two t ypes, (a,b) to denote pairs, x:A] b to denote a -abstraction, (x:A) B to denote a dependent function space. Finally, a record type R is represented as an inductive t ype with a single constructor Build_R. Selectors are functions (de ned by case-analysis) so we write l a instead of the more standard a.l.
Representation of JavaCard programs
JavaCard programs are nothing but Java programs satisfying additional constraints. They can be compiled on a class by class basis by a standard compiler, yielding a class le for each class being compiled. For the purpose of JavaCard, compilation is followed by a further transformation phase where a converter transforms the set of class les corresponding to a package into a single CAP le, provided the former are JavaCard compliant. Finally, CAP les are linked before execution (recall JavaCard does not support dynamic class loading) during this last phase, constant pools are resolved and eliminated. Our representation of programs is based on this last format.
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Representation of data structures
The JavaCard Virtual Machine distinguishes between primitive t ypes and reference types (for instances of arrays, classes and interfaces). We use a mutual inductive t ype to enforce the distinction. Formally, t h e t ype of primitive t ypes is de ned (in Coq) by: In principle our representation of types allows to form arrays of arrays, which is not permitted in JavaCard. However our formalisation, in particular the implementation of anewarray, d o e s n o t allow to form such a type. (It is also straightforward to modify our formalisation not to allow s u c h t ypes to be formed.)
Representation of programs
Programs are simply represented by their interfaces, classes and methods. Note that, by default, interfaces and classes of the java.lang package and instances of these classes are an integral part of our program. This includes in particular the class Object, t h e i n terface Shareable, and Exception classes. Formally, w e use the following structure to represent programs: The types Interface, Class and Method are themselves de ned as record types. We brie y describe their structure below. Classes A class is described by its superclasses 1 (if any), its methods (including constructors and distinguishing between public methods and package methods), the interfaces it implements, its class variables and, in the case of Java Card, its owning package. For execution purposes, we also need to keep track of the index of the class. Formally, w e use the following structure to represent classes:
Record Class : Set := { (* List of all super classes of this class *) super : (list class_idx) 1 Our description of a class c refers to all the classes from which c inherits, i.e. to which c is related by the transitive closure of the superclass relation. For execution purposes, these classes are gathered into a list. Our convention is that the immediate superclass of c appears rst in the list. This encoding is chosen to avoid de ning functions by well-founded recursion over the subclass relation. where method_idx is the type of method indexes (the constructors are used to ag methods' visibility).
Our representation does not take i n to account the maximum depth of the operand stack during execution of the method. It is a simple matter to include this information but, during execution, we would need to perform many c hecks.
Interfaces Much of the information about interfaces is irrelevant for our purposes. Indeed, the linker veri es that a class implements correctly an interface and integrates the relevant information, such as a method's signature, directly into the formalisation of the classes implementing the interface. Hence one only needs to keep track of the super-interfaces of an interface (e.g. to check the compatibility o f t wo a r r a ys of interfaces). Formally, w e use the following structure to represent i n terfaces:
Record Interface : Set := { (* List of all super interfaces *) super_int : (list interf_idx) (* Index of the interface *) int_id : interf_idx }.
A speci c interface provided by the JavaCard APIs is the Shareable interface which p l a ys a crucial role in the JavaCard security model. In our formalisation, as in Java Card, an interface i is shareable i it is Shareable or when the index of the interface Shareable is a memberof super_int i.
Methods A method is characterised by its status (whether it is static or not), its signature (against which one can type-check its arguments upon invocation), its number of local variables (for initialising its execution context), its exception handlers, its list of instructions to be executed and nally the indexes of the method and of its owning class. Formally, w e use the following structure to represent methods:
Record Method : Set := { (* Indicates whether a method is static or not *) is_static : bool (* Signature of the method, pair of domain / codomain *)
A Formal Executable Semantics of the J a vaCard Platform where the type handler_type collects the information required to de ne the best handler for a given program counter and exception. Formally, w e use the following structure to represent handler types:
Definition handler_type := (bytecode_idx*bytecode_idx*class_idx*bytecode_idx).
The rst two elements de ne the range at which the exception handler is active. The third element de nes the class of exceptions that the handler is meant t o c a t c h, whereas the last element p o i n ts to the rst bytecode to execute if this handler is chosen.
A r emark on correctness The above representation makes some implicit assumptions about the program. For example, the index of a method should be less or equal to the number of methods contained in the program. These assumptions are formalised as predicates on jcprogram. This is the (mild) price to pay for not using dependent t ypes to represent programs.
The JCVM Tools
The transformation of JavaCard programs into cap les may be performed by standard tools, namely any Java compiler and JavaCard converter. In order to translate JavaCard programs into our format, we h a ve developed a toolset, called the JCVM Tools (over 4,000 lines of Java code). The JCVM Tools transform a set of CAP les into a Coq expression of type jcprogram. In addition, the JCVM Tools provide a graphical user interface to browse through programs and allow to modify compiled JavaCard programs (so as to check the behaviour of our formal semantics on incorrect programs). We h a ve used the JCVM Tools to debug our formalisation.
The Virtual Machine
The Virtual Machine is described by a small-step semantics more precisely, e a c h instruction is formalised as a state transformer, i.e. a function that takes as input a state (before the instruction is executed) and returns a new state (after the instruction has been executed).
Values
In order to formalise the virtual machine, we rst need to represent, for each J a vaCard type, its possible values. These can either be arithmetic values or non-computational values such as memory addresses. Both can be represented as integers for the latter, we use an implicit coercion from non-computational values to integers. As in 40], we tag values with their types. Formally, w e set: 2 Definition valu := type*Z. 2 The expression value is already used for the lift monad so we u s e valu instead.
Here Z is the (inductive) type of binary integers provided by the Coq library. While the inductive representation is suitable for reasoning (each i n teger has a unique representation in Z), it is less suited for computing and functions such as division are not part of the standard library. Besides, existing operations are not suitable to model over ows. In order to provide an accurate treatment of arithmetic, we therefore proceed as follows:
1. we i n troduce an alternative representation Z_bits of integers as lists of bits 2. we de ne all arithmetic operations as functions over Z_bits. These functions abide to Sun's speci cations for over ows 3. we de ne bi-directional coercions between Z and Z_bits to switch b e t ween the two representations.
The memory model
States are formalised as triples consisting of the heap (containing the objects created during execution), the static heap (containing static elds of classes) and a stack of frames (environments for executing methods). Formally, states are de ned by:
Definition jcvm_state := static_heap*heap*stack.
Below w e describe these three components, but we start with a description of objects.
Objects They can either be class instances or arrays. Thus the type of objects is naturally described as an inductive (sum) type. Formally:
Inductive obj : Set := Instance : type_instance -> obj | Array : type_array -> obj.
where both type_instance and type_array are record types that contain all the relevant information for describing instances and arrays respectively. F or example, a class instance is described by the index of the class from which the object is an instance, the instance variables (as a list of valu), the reference to the owning package and a ag to indicate whether the object is an entry point and whether it is a permanent o r temporary entry point (entry points are used in the JavaCard security model for access control). Formally, we set: Arrays are formalised in a similar fashion. We do not store an array's elements as inhabitants of valu, s i n c e all its elements are required to be of the same type. Hence the latter can be given separately and stripped o from the description of the array's elements. Formally we s e t : T h e l a s t t wo elds respectively store the array's owning package and a ag indicating whether the array i s global.
A Each frame has its own array of local variables and its own operand stack w h i c h is used to store a method's parameters and results. A frame also has a counter pointing to the next instruction to be executed, a reference to the current method, and a reference to the context of the current method (this context plays a fundamental role in the rewall mechanism). Formally, a frame is described by: The analyzed_method is only used in Section 5 to de ne the abstraction function that maps each state to an abstract state the abstraction function is itself used to express the correctness of the ByteCode Veri er.
Instructions
Instructions can be classi ed into the following 8 categories: arithmetic operations (sadd, idiv, sshr...) checks on objects (instanceof...) branchings, possibly conditional (ifcmp, goto...) method invocations (invokestatic, invokevirtual...) instructions operating on local variables (iload, sstore...) instructions operating on objects, arrays or instances (getfield, arraylength...) instructions operating on the operand stack (ipush, pop...) return instructions (sreturn, throw...). We formalise the set of instructions as an inductive (sum) type instruction.
The semantics of each instruction is formalised using a function of type:
jcvm_state * operands ! returned_state
The type operands is not a Coq expression but a type determined by the instruction to be executed. In order to handle abrupt termination (that may arise because of uncaught exceptions), the codomain of the function is an inductive (sum) type:
Inductive returned_state: Set := Normal : jcvm_state->returned_state | Abnormal : xcpt->jcvm_state->returned_state.
In case of normal execution, the returned state is the one obtained after execution of the instruction (tagged with Normal), whereas in the case of abrupt termination, the returned state is that of the virtual machine when the uncaught exception was raised (tagged with Abnormal and the nature of the uncaught exception).
In order to execute the virtual machine, we collect the semantics of each instruction in a one-step execution function exec_instr of type: instruction*state*program ! returned_state
Note that one cannot use exec_instr to build a function that takes as input a program and returns as output its result because Coq only supports terminating functions. However, we h a ve used Coq's extraction mechanism successfully to derive a one-step execution function in CAML and wrapped it up with a while-loop to produce a certi ed JavaCard Virtual Machine.
Exception Management
JavaCard exceptions can either be raised by the program, via the instruction athrow, or by the virtual machine. In addition, execution may simply fail in case of an incoherence due to a memory problem, e.g. if a reference is not found in heap, or an execution problem, e.g. an empty s t a c k f o r a pop. Our formalisation collects these three kinds of exceptions in an inductive (sum) type. Beware that exceptions in the virtual machine are represented as instances of exception classes, and not as inhabitants of the type xpct. In fact, we use the latter to give the semantics of exception handling.
We n o w turn to exception handling. Two situations may occur: the machine aborts. In the case of a JCVMError, the virtual machine is unable to continue the execution and, by calling an abort function, an abnormal state labelled by the error is returned the exception handling mechanism is launched. In order to catch an exception, one searches for an adequate handler through the stack. This procedure is recursive (it is one of the few places where our formalisation uses recursion), as illustrated below. The function performs various checks, such a s e . g . violation_security_invokevirtual. This security check implements the rewall mechanism. E.g. in case the object nhp is an instance, the function will verify whether (1) the active c o n text is the JavaCard Runtime Environment c o n text 3 or (2) the active context is also the context of the instance's owner or (3) the instance is an entry point. If not, the function returns true to ag a security violation.
Abstract Virtual Machine
When reasoning about the virtual machine and/or applications, it is convenient to omit some of its intricacies and consider simpli ed virtual machines instead. In this section, we d e v elop such an abstract virtual machine that manipulates types instead of values. This abstract virtual machine represents, in some sense, a typechecking algorithm for the concrete virtual machine and indeed, in the next section, we s h o w h o w t o d e r i v e a ByteCode Veri er from this abstraction.
Abstract memory model
As a rst approximation, we would like our abstract values to be the set of (JavaCard) types. However, return addresses needs a special treatment. In the semantics of the instruction ret, it is required that the 3 The JavaCard Runtime Environment is privileged and may access all objects. rst operand is a value val of type Return_Address and the integer part of val is used to indicate the next value of the program counter. If we simply forget about the integer part of val, w e are simply unable to indicate the program point where execution is to be continued. We therefore adapt the de nition of (abstract, JavaCard) types to store the value to which the program counter needs to be updated. Formally, abstract values are identi ed with abstract types. The latter are de ned using a mutually recursive t ype and the type of abstract primitives types de ned by:
Inductive abs_type_prim : Set := abs_ReturnAddress : nat -> abs_type_prim | ... The memory model is simpli ed likewise: the heap disappears. Indeed, the type of objects created during execution is always stored in the stack so the heap is not needed any longer. the stack disappears and is replaced by a frame. Indeed, execution may be performed on a method by method basis so that only the return type is required for executing a method's invocation (we return to the abstract semantics of invokevirtual in the next subsection). Hence we only need to consider one abstract frame instead of the stack.
We still need to maintain the static heap, abstracted as a list of types. The static heap is used for example in the semantics of get_static. F ormally, w e set:
Definition abs_jcvm_state := abs_static_heap*abs_frame.
We n o w turn to the execution model. Execution becomes non-deterministic because some branching instructions may return to di erent program points depending upon the value on top of the operand stack (and we d o n o t have access to the value). In order to handle this non-determinism, the corresponding abstract instructions are required to return a list of possible returned states. Formally, instructions are formalised as functions of type: abs_jcvm_state * operands ! (list abs_returned_state)
As for the concrete virtual machine, one de nes a one-step abstract execution function abs_exec_instruction of type: instruction*abs_state*program ! abs_returned_state
Exception management
The abstract virtual machine cannot handle standard JavaCard exceptions such a s NullPointer or Arithmetic exceptions because they depend on values forgotten during the abstraction. In fact, the only exceptions handled by the abstract virtual machine are those caused by an incorrect program.
Semantics of the abstract invokevirtual
The abstract semantics for new_frame_invokevirtual does not create a new frame nor perform a check for security exceptions. Moreover the resulting state becomes:
(abs_Normal (sh, (Build_abs_frame (app_return_type l' (Snd (signature m))) (abs_locvars h) (abs_method_loc h) (abs_context_ref h) (S (abs_p_count h)))))
The return type of the method called (if di erent f r o m Void) is added to the operand stack of the current frame by calling the function app_return_type and the program counter is incremented.
Correctness
In where absolu coerces an integer to its absolute value (in nat) a n d type_to_abs_type coerces a type to its corresponding abstract type.
Now w e need to extend the function alpha_val to a function alpha that maps every state to an abstract state. It is a simple matter to extract an abstract static heap from a state, but some care is needed to extract an abstract frame from a stack. Indeed, we cannot map a stack to the abstraction of its top frame, because of the invokevirtual function (concrete execution creates a new frame whereas abstract execution does not). In order to cope with this situation, we use the ag of the current analysed frame m. I f m is on the top of the stack then it is abstracted. If there are other frames above, the return type of the frame just above the analysed frame is added to the operand stack o f m and m is then abstracted.
Finally, we extend the function alpha to a function alpha_ret that maps every returned state to an abstract returned state. The correctness of the abstraction is then stated as a commuting diagram relating concrete and abstract execution (up to subtyping), see Figure 1 . The hooked vertical arrow on the right-hand side of the diagram and the sign at the bottom-right corner mean that the abstraction of the concrete returned state is, up to subtyping, a member of the list of abstract returned states. We h a ve shown 4 in Coq that the diagram commutes (up to subtyping), provided concrete execution does not raise any exception except by calling AbortCode (as discussed above, other exceptions cannot be handled by the abstract virtual machine). It follows that every call to AbortCode at the concrete level is matched at the abstract level. This is the key to proving the correctness of the ByteCode Veri er.
Application: a Certi ed ByteCode Veri er
The ByteCode Veri er is a k ey component of JavaCard's security. Below w e present a certi ed ByteCode Veri er derived from the abstract virtual machine described in the previous section. Our ByteCode Veri er ensures that, at every program point, the local variables and the operand stack are appropriately typed for the instruction to be executed. It also ensures that, if a program point is reached several times, the size and type of the operand stack m ust remain equal. Our ByteCode Veri er treats the whole set of instructions but is not complete: it does not treat subroutines in their full generality nor object initialisation.
The veri cation algorithm
All the properties suggested above, except the last one, can be veri ed by executing the abstract Virtual Machine. For the last property, w e also have to record the (abstract) state of the (abstract) virtual machine after each step of execution. More precisely, w e store an uninitialised returned state for each program point of the analysed method. After each step of execution, we c heck if the instruction has been performed before and if so, unify in a suitable way the returned state with the state that was stored for this instruction. In case of success, the resulting state after uni cation state is saved again. If, after uni cation, the saved state has not changed, the execution can stop for this particular execution path.
Some instructions require some extra care, e.g. (1) for instructions that can lead to two di erent program points, the execution must continue from both branching points (2) for exception handlers, the catch block m ust be executed from the beginning with the appropriate arguments, and at the return point of the exception handler, an uni cation must occur.
Correctness of the ByteCode Veri er
The correctness of the ByteCode Veri er comprises two parts: a proof of termination. It requires to de ne a well-founded relation on types and to prove that each uni cation step produces a state that is strictly smaller than the state that was previously stored. The proof is highly non trivial and is used to de ne by well-founded recursion the ByteCode Veri er as a function bcv:jcprogram ! bool a proof of correctness. One needs to prove that, if bytecode veri cation is successful, then the function AbortCode will not be called. The proof, which uses the correctness of the abstraction, ensures that the ByteCode Veri er enforces the expected properties.
Conclusion
We h a ve presented an executable formal semantics of the JavaCard Virtual Machine and ByteCode Veri er. With 15,000 lines of Coq scripts, our formalisation constitutes the most in-depth machine-checked account of the JavaCard platform to date.
Related work
Applications of formal methods and programming language theory to Java and JavaCard are ourishing. Due to space constraints, we only comment on works that emphasise machine-checked veri cation of the Java or JavaCard platforms, either at platform or application level. Other works that do not emphasise machine-checked veri cation include: formal speci cations of the Java or JavaCard platforms, see e.g. 7, 10, 17, 22] , speci cation languages for expressing properties of Java programs, see e.g. 29, 35] , and more specialised works that focus on speci c aspects of Java o r J a vaCard, see e.g. 16, 24, 27, 34, 38, 41] .
Platform-oriented projects One of the most impressive a c hievements to date is that of the Bali project 2], which has formalised in Isabelle/HOL a large body of the Java platform, including (1) the type system and the operational semantics of both the source language and the bytecode, with a proof of type-safety a t b o t h levels (2) the compiler, an abstract ByteCode Veri er and an abstract lightweight ByteCode Veri er, with a proof of their correctness (3) a sound and complete axiomatic semantics to reason about Java programs. This work is comprehensive in that it treats all components of the Java platform, both at source and bytecode level, but does not take all aspects of Java (let alone JavaCard) into account. For example, Pusch's account 40] of the Java Virtual Machine does not handle arithmetic, exceptions, interfaces and initialisation and Nipkow's 36] and Klein and Nipkow's 5] accounts of the ByteCode Veri er focus on an even smaller fragment of the JVM. Thus, we see our work as complementary to theirs and as further evidence that, as suggested in 37], machine-checking the design of a non-trivial programming language has become a reality .
Other partial formalisations of the Java a n d JavaCard platforms are reported by Y . Bertot 8] (object initialisation in Coq after 19]), by R . Cohen 14] (defensive JVM in ACL2), by T . Jensen and co-authors 43] (converter in Coq), by J.-L. Lanet and A. Requet 30] (JCVM in B) , by Z . Qian and co-workers 13] (JVM and BCV in Specware) and by D. Syme 45] (operational semantics, type system and type soundness of source Java in DECLARE).
Application-oriented projects Application-oriented projects may be further classi ed on the basis of the veri cation techniques used. These can either be mostly logical or mostly algorithmic.
Logical approaches The LOOP tool 32], which a l l o ws to reason about (source) Java programs via a front-end to PVS and Isabelle, has been applied successfully to the veri cation of some standard Java class libraries and more recently to the JavaCard APIs. The key ingredients underlying the LOOP's approach are (1) a type-theoretical semantics of Java programs and of the Java memory model (2) an axiomatic logic to reason about Java programs and Java features, including exceptions, abrupt termination and inheritance (3) a tool to compile Java classes into PVS or Isabelle theories that form the basis for actual veri cations. The main di erences with our work are that their semantics works at source level and that it is not directly executable.
Rather similar techniques have been developed independently by A . P oetsch-He ter and co-workers 33, 39], while in 11], P. Brisset combines logical and algorithmic techniques to verify the correctness of Java's security manager. Further uses of logical techniques for the veri cation of Java programs are reported in 1, 15, 21] .
Algorithmic approaches The Bandera project 3] has developed a toolset to verify automatically properties of (source) Java programs via a back-end to model-checkers such as SMV and Spin. The toolset has been successfully applied to verify properties of multi-threaded Java programs. The key ingredients underlying the Bandera's approach are (1) a (temporal logic like) speci cation language to describe program properties (2) a toolset 5 that extracts from Java source code compact nite-state models (3) an abstraction speci cation language and an abstraction engine that derives the abstract program for a given program and abstraction.
Further uses of algorithmic techniques to verify Java programs have been reported e.g. by P. Bieber and co-authors 9] (abstraction and model-checking to detect transitive o ws in JavaCard), T. Jensen and co-workers 28] (abstraction and nite-state veri cation to verify control-ow security properties of Java programs), K. Havelund 23] (Java Path Finder, model-checking of concurrent Java programs), K. R. M. Leino and co-authors 31] (Extended Static Checking, with a back-end to the theorem-prover Simplify). In addition, numerous program analyses and type systems have been designed to verify properties of Java programs.
Future work
Our primary objective is to complete our work into a full formalisation of the JavaCard platform (at the bytecode level) that may be used as a basis for reasoning about JavaCard programs. Clearly, much work remains to be done. Below w e only outline the most immediate problems we i n tend to tackle.
Platform level First and foremost, one needs to complete the formalisation of the ByteCode Veri er. The key challenge is of course to handle subroutines. We s e e t wo complementary options here: the rst one is to provide a full account of subroutines along the lines of 19, 44] . An alternative, rst suggested by S . F reund in 18] and recently implemented in the KVM 12] , would be to consider a program transformation that translates away subroutines and prove its correctness. Second, it would be interesting to consider some JVM features such as garbage collection and multi-threading.
Application level Many security properties can be expressed as temporal logic formulae over a program's execution trace and can in principle be veri ed by suitable algorithmic techniques. However, the so-called state space explosion problem often puts practical limits to program veri cation. In order to be able to verify realistic programs, many authors, see e.g. 6], have suggested that algorithmic veri cation should be preceded or combined with abstraction techniques that help reduce the state space. In this paper, we focused on the type abstraction which, in many respects, underlies the ByteCode Veri er. We are currently trying to develop a method to generate automatically an abstract virtual machine and a proof of its correctness for any abstraction function mapping states to a suitably chosen notion of abstract states.
